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1. INTRODUCTION. 
Merger activity fluctuates along the business cycle. The empirical evidence shows 
that both the number of mergers and the volume of assets merged are positively 
related to the rate of growth of GDP and negatively related to the interest rate. 
There is also some less conclusive evidence pointing to a Positive relationship 
between merger activity and risk. Weston, Chung and Hoag (1990) review the 
empirical evidence on the determinants of aggregate merger activity. 
The purpose of this paper is to examine several competing explanations of these 
facts. Specifically, we develop a model of the timing of mergers and consider 
various alternative explanations of merger waves in this framework. Our main 
insight is that financial variables alone might be insufficient to explain the 
occurrence of merger waves. Alternatively, institutional changes described in the 
managerial literature may be largely responsible for the observed behavior of 
merger activity. 
This paper also examines the empirical evidence. Financial theories of merger 
waves imply a merger cycle of about four years, similar to the length of the 
business cycle. Institutionalist arguments imply a much larger and not necessarily 
regular period. Econometric analysis of the Large Merger Series of the FfC revels 
an average period of 17 years. This provides further support to the institutional or 
managerial view. 
We have identified four different arguments relating merger activity to 
macroeconomic conditions: the investment opportunity synergy hypothesis, the cost 
of financing hypothesis, the bargain hypothesis and the institutional change 
hypothesis. The first and the second are roughly consistent with the available 
empirical evidence on U.S. financial markets; the third is contrary to it; and the last 
one is based on case-studies of changes in legal regulations and market conditions. 
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None of these theories is based on a formal explicit model, making it difficult to 
compare each other. The main task of this research has been to develop a model of 
the leading financial explanation, namely, the investment opportunity synergy 
hyPOthesis. This allows us to develop some arguments on the implications and 
explanatory power of this theory. 
There are at least two reasons why a deeper understanding of the economic forces 
that produce merger waves is desirable. First, this is a necessary step in the 
development of forecasts of merger activity. Second, examination of aggregated 
merger series provides a test-bank for the (challenged) hyPOthesis of financial 
markets efficiency and, particularly, it may shed some light on the often debated 
question of whether mergers are generally efficient or not. A detailed consideration 
of these issues, with an analysis of the FI'C "Large Firm" Merger time series, will 
be delayed until sections 4 and 5. First, in section 2, we survey the literature on 
merger waves, and we introduce the model in section 3. Some conclusions are 
given in section 6. 
2. THEORIES AND EVIDENCE. 
An extended survey of the theories and evidence on merger waves can be found in 
Weston et al. (1990)1. We shall concentrate on the stylized facts only. Merger 
activity is measured in two alternative ways: as the total number of mergers 
recorded or as the volume of assets merged during one year or during one quarter. 
In any case, merger activity series cover long periods of time (typically 30 years 
and more) so that the word "wave" refers in this context to changes in merger 
activity lasting for relatively long periods of time. 
1 Another illuminating survey on mergers can also be found in Scherer and Ross 
(1987). 
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The stylized facts on the relationship between merger activity and macroeconomic 
and financial conditions in the U.S. market are the following: 
First, increases in stock prices are positively related to merger activity. 
Second, mergers are negatively related to increases in bond yields and real 
interest rates. 
Third, there is a positive relationship between the rate ofgrowth of GNP and 
merger activity. 
Fourth, merger activity is positively related to default risks as measured by 
the difference between the yields on long-term corporate BAA and AAA 
bonds. 
And fifth, there is a positive relationship between merger activity and the 
tightness of external fund availability defined as the spread between short-
term and long-term interest rates. 
In the absence of a theory no causal relationship can be identified in these empirical 
findings. In summary, mergers are found to be procyclical. 
It is also important to note that, apparently, acquiring firms rely heavily on 
borrowed funds, although we are unaware of any estimate of the proportion of 
mergers financed in this way. We have identified up to four explanations of all or 
part of this evidence. We consider each in turn. 
2.1. The investment opportunity synergy hypothesis (lOS). 
Roughly the IOS hypothesis considers mergers just as another form of investment. 
Thus any factor influencing investment will also change merger activity in the same 
direction. Bittlingmayer (1987) explores in depth this idea and finds a positive 
relationship between mergers and general investment spending for both the U .S. and 
the German economies. In this view mergers will occur if the expected benefits 
from the merger are expected to be greater than its cost. Economic conditions may 
affect the benefits to mergers. 
The main testable implications of the 10S hypothesis relate to interest rates and 
GDP growth. First, interest rates are negatively related to investment because 
higher interest rates increase the opportunity cost of the funds invested. Hence also 
merger activity should be inversely related to the interest rate. Second, if increases 
in the rate of growth of the economy reflect improved investment opportunities, 
then merger activity should be procyclical. On the other hand, the hypothesis does 
not bear any direct implication on the default risk and the short to long term interest 
rate spread although both variables are included in the empirical study. 
Chung (1982) develops a regression model along these lines. The signs of the 
coefficients of the interest rate and GDP growth are as expected. Defaults risks and 
interest rates spreads are also included in the regression and are also found to have 
significant coefficients. However the structure of the model2 makes it impossible 
to make any inference on the order of magnitude of the effects, i.e., only the sign 
but not the value of the coefficients can be interpreted. 
In our view this is a reasonable explanation of merger waves. The question, 
however, is whether the magnitude of these "investment effects" is large enough to 
explain actual merger waves. 
2.2. The cost of financing hypothesis (COF). 
According to Melicher, Ledolter and 0'Antonio (1983) acquiring firms rely heavily 
on borrowed funds. Thus, the cost of these funds, measured by the interest rate 
must affect merger activity. 
2 All explanatory variables are the sum of current and two lagged values. 
Golbe and White (1987) test this hypothesis in a regression model together with 
other variables and find that the coefficient of the real interest rate is not statistically 
significant in their model. This evidence, however, is far from conclusive since the 
tested model includes other ad hoc variables. Other measure of the cost of 
financing, the bond yield considered by Chung (1982), yields a significant 
coefficient with the expected sign. 
The basic idea underlying COF is similar to 10S. However, here the emphasis is 
on how mergers are financed while 10S focus on how investing in acquiring a firm 
compares to other investment alternatives'. Thus, a profitable merger under the 
10S hypothesis may not be realized if it has to be financed with debt. IOS and COF 
can be considered complementary explanations of merger activity. 
2.3. The bargains hypothesis. 
Golbe and White (1987) test the following "bargains" hypothesis: it is more likely 
to buy a firm if its price is low; thus, in times of relatively low stock prices, 
mergers will be more common. They test this hypothesis using Tobin's "q" as an 
explanatory variable of merger activity in a regression model and find a significant 
coefficient. However, the coefficient has a positive sign. So the data rejects the 
hypothesis. 
This finding is hardly surprising. While cheaper firms may be more attractive to 
buyers, it is likely that a low price also reflects a small willingness of investors to 
pay for the firm. In other words, firm's stock valuations are as much a consequence 
as a cause of stock purchasing decisions. 
2.4. The Institutional Change Hypothesis (lC). 
3 The lack of an explicit model makes.it difficult to compare the hypothesis. 
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Finally, the fourth explanation of merger waves relates uprising in merger activity 
to changes in both market conditions and the regulatory framework and, 
specifically, to changes in antitrust policies. Shleifer and Vishny (1991) review the 
evidence on the two merger waves of the 60's and the 80's. 
They argue that the wave of the 60's may be the consequence of managerial 
discretion joined to a tight antitrust policy. Conglomerate mergers were common 
during this period and, the evidence suggest, not particularly successful. Many of 
the conglomerates created during the 60's were later destroyed and the profitability 
of the acquired firms did not improve on average. 
On the other hand, the 80's merger wave evolved after a turn in the antitrust policy, 
allowing related mergers to take place much more easily. In the 80's competitive 
conditions were harsher forcing firms to adopt restructuring plans and to specialize. 
In this context, mergers were typically among related firms and were followed by 
restructuring and divestiture. There is still little evidence on the ex-post 
performance of the 80's takeovers. 
Shleifer and Vishny interpret these two waves as consequences of their respective 
institutional frameworks, suggesting that the merger wave of the 60's was probably 
inefficient for the economy as a whole despite the favorable stock price reaction to 
takeover announcements; the 80's takeover wave is interpreted, on the other hand, 
was an organizational adjustment during a severe crisis of american industry. 
In this view, the correlation between mergers and macroeconomic and financial 
variables might be simply spurious. 
2.5. Overview of the rest of the paper. 
From this quick review of the literature we conclude that there are two main 
competing explanations of merger waves. One is the IOS hypothesis (into which the 
COF hypothesis can be easily incorporated). The other is the IC hypothesis which 
focus on non-financial qualitative change. 
Our objective is to compare these two alternatives. In order to do so we develop an 
explicit model of the merger-as-an-investment.framework and ask whether in this 
framework, merger waves are likely to occur. We find that, while not impossible, 
large merger waves are unlikely to occur in this framework. This gives some 
additional support to the IC hypothesis as the leading explanation of procyclica1 
merger activity. 
3. A MODEL OF THE IOS HYPOTHESIS. 
Our strategy in building the model is to define first profits for each of the firms 
involved as a function of the relevant exogenous variables suggested in the literature 
(financial structure and underlying economic conditions). Next, we define the value 
of a merger as the difference between the expected profits of the merged firm and 
those of the original firms. Finally, the effect of exogenous changes on the value 
of the merger is analyzed. 
3.1. The basic model. 
Consider two firms labelled 1 and 2 respectively. At time t firm i has assets valued 
at Ti dollars. Own resources amount to Fi and debt equals Di • 
The relationship Ti = Fi+Di holds and Ti will be occasionally regarded as the size 
of firm i. C1 =Di rci is the debt ratio. The cash-flow of firm i is a random variable 
x with mean TiJI and variance Ti rr. 
F [(x - p.TJ luVTJ is the c.d.f. of x. Debt has to be repaid after one period and 
is contracted at an interest rate r. One period expected profits are: 
The parameters (p, ,;,r) change over time p, the average return per dollar invested 
measures investment opportunities and can be interpreted as can be proxies by the 
overall state of the economy measured as (one plus) the rate of growth of GDP. It 
is larger when the economy is growing and smaller during recessions. tr measures 
economic risk. The interest rate r depends on p,tr, and monetary policies. 
In order to keep the model tractable it is assumed that the probability distribution 
of p and tr at time t, H(p,er), does not depend on past values of p and tr. The 
interest rate is assumed to be a (deterministic) function of p and tr. This is a 
simplifying assumption but it is also a convenient one. It assures that market values 
cannot be improved on the basis of current information. Thus, the assumption is 
consistent with market efficiency. 
Let A; be the average value of firm i over all the possible states of the economy 
(p,cr), given its size TI and assuming that all debt is repaid at the end of the period. 
Since we assume that current values of p. and a are time independent, the value of 
the firm is also time independent. 
A; is the sum of the expected future profits of the firm discounted by a factor p. 
Market instability may affect mergers since greater risks of bankruptcy can be 
partly compensated by means of risk-pooling through a merger. 
Let VI (Di,TI , p,er) be the value of firm i when the state of the economy is (p,a). 
We assume the value of a firm after bankruptcy to be equal to zero. Then the value 
of the firm equals expected one-period profits plus the discounted average value A; 
corrected by the probability that the firm will not default: 
Iffirms I and 2 merge, the resulting firm, labelled 0, will have assets To=T.+T2, 
debt Do=D.~~, and an average value Ao which is exogenously given". Cashflow 
follows the same distribution F with parameters "To and,r To. One period profits 
and the value of the merged firm are defined as before. Also, it is natural to assume 
that Act> A. +~ since otherwise the merger is not profitable in the long-ron. 
In this context the value of a merger depends on the current state of the economy. 
Specifically, we define the value of the merger as: 
(3) 
The IOS hypothesis can now be formally stated: the merger will take place 
whenever M > O. Since M depends on the state of the economy and the financial 
structure of the merging firms, mergers will tend to occur more often, at an 
aggregate level, in those states and debt levels in which M is larger. Thus, increases 
in M can be related to an overall increase in merger activity. Notice that, in this 
framework, mergers are viewed as an investment decision, i.e., this model captures 
the basic notion of IOS hypothesis. 
The expression for M can be simplified, after integrating by parts each of the three 
integrals, to obtain: 
(4) 
4 The value of Ao is taken to be exogenous since, otherwise, one particular theory of 
merger decisions would have to be assumed. Our objective is to keep the model open to 
alternative theories of the merger decision. 
9• 
Where 
CIi = I-F [ ( (1 +r>e.-,JVT1 I ,,] 
and 
By definition, Qi is the probability of survival of firm i, i.e, it is the probability that 
firm i will be able to repay its debt. Hence (p.Qi.AJ is the discounted expected 
value of the firm next period and ~ is a measure of the value of limited 
responsibility for each firm. It is the expected loss transferred to third parties (bond 
holders and other firm's suppliers) conditional on the firm not being able to repay 
its debt. In other words, ~ is the expected loss of the creditors of the firms in case 
of bankruptcy. The value of the merger depends on these two factors. We define 
M, =p(~-AICL -~qJ (5) 
as the yJUue of risk poolin& generated by a merger. It measures the value of 
reducing the probability of bankruptcy by means of a merger. We also define 
(6) 
as the value of the chan&e in the risk transfer to third parties generated by a merger. 
Notice that M= M.+My • 
Intuitively one would expect the value of risk pooling to be positive since the 
probability of bankruptcy is smaller for larger firms. On the other hand, My should 
be negative since the transfer of losses to third parties occurs only in case of 
bankruptcy which, as noted before, is smaller for larger firms. 
~ 
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3.2. Comparative statics. 
Let's consider now the effect of changes in the underlying economic conditions on 
the value of a merger. It is instructive to consider MTand M, separately. The value 
of the risk transfer reacts to changes in economic conditions as follows. 
PROPosmON 1. Suppose p. > (1 +r)ei (the expected return on investment is 
enough to repay the outstanding debt). Then MTis procyclica1', Le., it is increasing 
in p. and decreasing in r. 
PROOF: Taking derivatives it follows that: 
d M-rldp. = T} [Cl?-qtl + T2[Cl?-qJ > =0 
and 
d MT/dr = D} [q}-Cl?] + D2[Ch-'l?l < =0 (8) 
Notice that the assumption is innocuous. 
What this proposition says is that the wimmediateW effect of better expected returns 
on investment Oarger p.) or cheaper capital Oower r) is to make more attractive any 
merger, the reason being that it becomes less likely that the non-merged firms will 
default. This is not the whole story since there is another effect, M" related to 
future profits. But, at least in the extreme case of a totally myopic firm (p=0), 
proposition 1 shows a procyclical tendency in our model of merger. 
It can also be seen that the effect of changes in risk, D are indeterminate and that 
larger debt ratios decrease the value of MT' 
5 It can also be shown that dMT I de. <0 
, 
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Let's turn now our attention to the value of ris~ pooling, ~. Notice that the long-
run values AI of the firms appear in its definition. Thus, it may be expected that the 
effect of changes in the parameters will depend on ~. As a consequence there is 
no general rule to be learnt from the comparative static of Mp. Consider, for 
instance, a change in the return on investment: 
(9) 
Where ~ is the density of F valued at «1 +r)ei·p)\lTI /a 
The sign of this expression depends on both, the relative values of ~ and the 
relative values of ~6. Thus, we conclude that a procyclical merger activity is not 
a necessary logical implication of 10S. On the other hand, 10S may be true since 
it may be the case that MT dominates ~ or the latter may be procyclical itself. 
4. THE ROLE OF DEFAULT RISKS. 
The results presented in the last section clearly imply that the validity of 10S is an 
empirical question. Some empirical estimates are roughly consistent with the 10S 
hypothesis. So one may feel inclined to accept it, at least as an explanation of past 
events. The lack of determined implications of lOS, however, prevents its use as 
the basis ofa forecast of future merger waves. Changes in the structural parameters 
of the model may result in anticyclical merger waves within the 10S framework. 
In any case, it is possible to push the argument a little bit further. After all, 
empirical tests of 10S do not take into account other competing theories, namely, 
6 For instance, iffis the Nonna! density and Ao=AI+A2 then M, can be shown to 
be countercyclical while if Ao is large enough relative to (AI + AJ then M, can be shown to 
be procyclical. 
, 
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the IC hypothesis. Since misspecified models ,may yield erroneous estimates, the 
empirical evidence may not be conclusive. 
To evaluate the likelihood of 10S it is useful to examine the reasons why, in the 
model of section 3, the value of a merger is affected by the economic cycle. It can 
be seen that all changes occur via the distribution of F which measures the 
probability of default when it is evaluated at [({I +r)e.-pYT/a]. More specifically 
we have the following: 
PROPosmON 3:Suppose that the probability of default during the current period 
is zero (i.e., CID = q. = Cb = 1). Then the value of a merger is independent of current 
market conditions and, in particular, it is neither pro - or countercyclical. 
PROOf:Simply notice that, under the assumption, M= p(Ao-A1-AJ. 
According to the proposition, merger Waves under the 10S hypothesis would result 
from transfers, both intertemporal and among economic agents, ofbankruptcy risks. 
In the absence of these risks, the value of a merger is time-independent. Our point 
is that a theory of merger waves based exclusively on default risks is not plausible. 
While the effects identified both in the model and in the empirical analysis probably 
exist, we find it unlikely that the magnitude of these effects be significant enough 
to be responsible for merger waves. 
5. THE LENGTH OF THE CYCLE 
Finally, we address the empirical question. IOS implies that merger waves must be 
coupled to the business cycle, thus showing a periodicity of four to five years. On 
the other hand, the length of cycles under the IC hypothesis can be expected to be 
much larger. To confront both theories we estimate a simple time series model of 
merger activity in the U.S. and examine the length of the cycle. 
, 
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Specifically, we consider the FfC -Large Firm- series. The U.S. Federal trade 
Commission (FrC) collected and published data on mergers in the manufacturing 
and mining sectors of the U.S. economy and the resulting data base is generally 
considered a basic source for research in merger activity. We use the -Large Firm-
series which contains annual data for the number of mergers in which the acquired 
firm had at least $10 million in assets (book value) and for which information on 
the acquisition was publicly available (see Golbe and White (1987) for details). The 
sample is annual data for the years 1948-797• 
As a first check we test the hypothesis of a unit root by means of several test. The 
importance of this is that if we reject the unit root, then the series is stationary 
which supports the use of standard statistics in our empirical model. We test the 
hypothesis of a unit root by means of the Said and Dickey (1984) Augmented 
Dickey-Fuller statistic, the Park and Choi (1988) G(p,q) and J(p,q) statistics and the 
Phillips (1987) Za and ~ statistics. It is worth noting that in spite of the relatively 
small sample we use, it is known from the work of Perron (1991) that it is the span 
of data rather than the frequency of sampling which matters in estimating and 
testing the means of unit-root type models. In all cases, at reasonable significance 
levels, the tests rejects nonstationarity8. 
7 The optimal Box-Cox transformation was estimated by maximum likelihood. The 
estimated parameter lambda was 1.00065 (t-value: 16.23). Therefore no transformation seems 
to be needed for this data. Melicher et al. (1983) used logarithmic transformations for their 
quarterly data, but they did not estimate the optimal Box-Cox transformation. 
• We used many different possibilities, changing the order of the time polynomial in the 
null hypothesis and the number of lagged first difference terms in the fitted regression in the 
ADP test, we tried several kemals in the G(p,q) statistic, various orders of the time 
polynomial in the null hypothesis and in the order of the time polynomial in the fitted 
regression in the J(p,q) statistic, and different kemals and polynomial orders in Zar and Z, 
statistics. Detailed results are available on request from the authors. All the empirical work 
was carried out in GAUSS. 
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After the usual identification process, we decided to estimate an AR(2) model using 
White's (1980) heteroscedastic-consistent covariance matrix. The results are in 
Table I. Is interesting to note that the roots of the characteristic equation 
1 - 1.1884B + 0.4048B2 • 0 
are complex, so that pseudo-periodic behavior which may be observed on the series 
is to be expected. The period is about 17 years. This period may be interpreted as 
the •mean wave length· in the merger activity in the US. Therefore, after the 
merger wave in the late 1960s a new wave in the mid to late 1980s should not be 
very surprising. Thus, the merger wave of the 1980s is not a completely new 
phenomenon. Our simple model predicts this wave. 
There are two implications of these findings. First, our proposed test of the theory 
supports both the existence of merger waves and the IC Hypothesis and, thus, it 
contradicts the 10S Hypothesis. Notice, however, that an exact regularity is not 
required by the IC theory. Indeed, institutional changes may occur randomly or may 
be due to extra-economical reasons. 
The second implication is that, in previous empirical results, there is probably a 
missing variable. Long ron changes, like a 17 year period, in merger activity are 
not likely to be captured by interest rates or GDP growth rates. 
6. CONCLUSIONS. 
The main contribution of this paper is that it provides a formal model of the main 
hypothesis on the nature of merger waves found in the financial literature. 
Examination of the hypothesis under this light reveals some important weaknesses 
on the presumed implications of 10S. 
•IS 
In our view, qualitative changes in the institutional framework are largely 
responsible for the long-tenn changes in merger activity. Financial variables alone 
are unlikely to produce large merger waves even if smaller, more subtle 
movements, are influenced by this type of variabl~s. 
This conclusion may be criticized on the basis of the model not being able to ,
, 
capture some relevant aspect (unknown to us) of merger activity. Admittedly, the 
dynamic structure of the model is exceedingly simple. However, the model is 
sophisticated enough to highlight that: i) merger waves are not a necessary 
consequence of the IOS hypothesis; and ii) the magnitude of the intertemporal 
financial effects on the value of a merger may not be sufficient to explain merger 
waves. Furthennore, we have found some empirical evidence supporting these two 
claims. 
The implications of this paper are the following. First, future empirical research 
should incorporate qualitative institutional changes into the models. Second, doubts 
risen in the managerial literature on the efficiency of mergers have some further 
support fonn the arguments developed in this paper. And third, it is important for 
future research on merger waves to explicitly specify the underlying theory being 
tested. 
, 
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